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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's order on intermediate appeal affirming the 
magistrate's order denying Two Jinn Inc.'s ("Two Jinn") Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and 
Exonerate Bond ("motion to exonerate"). 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
In February 2005, Aaron Harris was charged with misdemeanor Driving Under the 
Influence in violation of I.C. 5 18-8004 in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. R. 8. On May 9, 2005, Mr. 
Harris pled guilty and was sentenced to two years of probation. R. 37. As relevant to this 
appeal, the state accused Mr. Harris of violating his probation in the Spring of 2007 and the 
magistrate ordered Mr. Harris to appear and show cause why his probation should not be revoked 
on June 6,2007. R. 59-60,67-69,76. Mr. Harris did not appear for court on June 6 and the 
court issued a warrant fol- his arrest setting bond at $5000. R. 77-78. After Mr. Harris was 
ai~ested on this warrant, Two Jinn posted a bond on behalf of 1,incoln General Insurance 
Company to secure Mr. Harris' presence in the probation violation proceedings. R. 4, 110. W. 
Harris appeared in couit on July 31 and September 17,2007. R. 79-82. On October 29,2007, 
Mr. Han-is appeared in court and admitted violating the terms of his probation. R. 93-94. 
On December 17, 2007, Mr. Hmis  did not appear in court for the disposition hearing but 
the magistrate declined to issue a warrant, indicating there may have been confusion regarding 
the court date. See R. 95-100. The court reset the disposition hearing for February 5,2008. R. 
5. The day prior to the hearing, Mi. Harris left an urgent message for his attorney requesting a 
continuance because he was unable to get the time off work to travel to C ~ e u r  d' Alene from 
Oregon. Tr. (10-31-2008), pg. 6, In. 10-17; see also R. 104. The magistrate denied the 
continuance and forfeited the bond posted by Two Jinn. R. 104-05; Tr. (10-31-2008),' pg. 7, 
On February 11,2008, Two Jinn assigned an investigator to locate Mr. Harris and bring 
him before the court. R. 122-23. The investigator contacted Mr. Harris by telephone and he 
informed the investigator that he had moved to Portland, Oregon but that he would retum to 
Idaho to address the warrant. R. 123. The investigator also contacted the co-signer on the bond, 
who assured the investigator that Mr. Harris would take care of the warrant or that the co-signor 
would pel-sonally retrieve Mr. Ha~ris from Portland. R. 123. Despite these assurances, Mr. 
Harris did not voluntarily appear in Idaho. In July 2008, the investigator obtained an address for 
the defendant in The Dalles, Oregon. R. 123. Another investigator traveled to The Dalles, 
located Mr. Harris, attempted to convince him to retum to Idaho, and offered him a ride. R. 126, 
Mr. Harris refused to return to Idaho with the investigator but indicated he would retum with the 
co-signer in a few days. R. 126. The investigator photographed Mr. Harris and his identification 
and took his fingeiyrints. R. 126-132. Because the warrant was not extraditable and Oregon law 
prohibits bail agents from arresting fugitives, the investigator lacked any legal recourse to retum 
Mr. Harris to Idaho involuntarily. R. 126. 
Two Jinn filed a motion to exonerate, attaching the affidavits of the investigators, 
j~hotographs of Mr. EIasris and his identification and fingerprints. R. 106-132. Two Jinn argued 
that, although i t  had gone to extensive efforts to locate Mr. Harris and had indeed found him, it 
could not return him to the couit due to the type of warrant issued and Oregon law. R. 108-09. 
I This transcript is ah exhibit in this appeal. R. 109 
2 
Two Jinn asselled that, therefore, justice did not requlre enforcement of the forfeiture. R. 109 
Following a hearlng on October 11, 2008, the magistrate denled Two Jinn's motion. R. 143 
Two Jinn appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate's decision. R. 145-47, 
176. Thls appeal follows. R. 178-79. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court e n  in affirming the magistrate's decision because the magistrate 
abused its discretion in denying Two Jin~i's motion to exonerate? 
B. Did the district court e n  in affirming the magistrate's decision because the magistrate 
erred in concluding the doctrine of impossibility did not require exoneration of the bond? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court 
directly reviews the district court's decision. I11 re Matey, 147 Idaho 604, 607, 213 P.3d 389, 392 
(2009); Losser 11. Bmdstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758,760 (2008). Thus, this Court 
reviews the magistrate court record to determine whether there is substantial, competent evidence 
to support the magistrate's factual findings and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law 
follow from those findings. Depnrtnzent of Henltlz & Welfare v. Doe, 147 Idaho 353, 355, 209 
P.3d 650,652 (2009); Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d at 760. If those findings are so 
supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's 
decision, this Court will affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Doe, 147 
Idaho at 35556,209 P.3d at 652-53; Losser, 145 Idaho at 672,183 P.3d at 760. 
B. The Magistrate Abused its Discretion in Concludi~~g That the Interests of Justice 
Required Forfeiture of the Bond. 
1. Governing legal standards 
If it appears that justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement, the court that 
forfeited the bail may direct that it be set aside. I.C.R. 46(e)(4).2 The decision whether to set 
aside a folfelture or exonerate bond under Rule 46(e)(4) 1s committed to the trral court's 
discretion. State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651,655, 167 P.3d 788, 792 (Ct. App. 
2007); State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 53,910 P.2d 164, 167 (Ct. App. 1994). In reviewing a trial 
court's exercise of discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within theouter boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Rupp, 123 Idaho 1,3,843 P.2d 151, 153 (1992); Quiclc Release Bnil Bonds, 144 Idaho at 
655, 167 P.3d at 792. 
The primary purpose of bail is not punitive but, rather, to ensure the presence of the 
accused. Quick Release Bnil Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. It is not the purpose of 
bail to collect revenue for the state. 8A Am. Jur. 2d $ 2. Additionally, public policy disfavors 
forfeitures. State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, I. 17-18,952 P.2d 1249, 1253-54 
(Ct. App. 1998); see also People v. Far West I n .  Co., 93 Cal.App.4th 791, 795 (2001) (the law 
traditionally disfavors forteitures and statutes imposing them are to be strictly construed); Board 
On June 15,2009, the Idaho Supreme Court repealed ICR 46 in its entirety and adopted 
a new I.C.R. 46, which became effective July 1,2009. Similarly, on April 1,2009, the 
legislature repealed previous bail statutes and enacted the Idaho Bail Act ("the Bail Act"), which 
also became effective July 1,2009. See 2009 Idaho Laws Ch. 90 (H.B. 184). Exoneration where 
justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement is now governed by I.C.R. 46(h) and I.C. $ 
19-2917. However, because Two Jinn filed it;motion to exonerate in 2008, the old rule governs 
this appeal. 
of Corn'rs of Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. App. 2003) ("Courts say 
that such statutes should be construed liberally to favor sureties, since justice does not favor 
forfeiture"). 
In deciding how much, if any, of the bond to forfeit, the court should consider: (1) the 
wilfulness of the defendant's violation of bail conditions; (2) the surety's participation in locating 
and apprehending the defendant; (3) the costs, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the state 
as a result of the violation; (4) any intangible costs; (5) the public's interest in ensuring a 
defendant's appearance; and (6) any mitigating factors. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 
655, 167 P.3d at 792; Fry, 128 Idaho at 53, 910 P.2d at 167. Other relevant factors mclude 
whether the state exhibited any actual interest in regaining custody of the delendant through 
prompt efforts to extradite him, whether the bonding company has attempted to assist or persuade 
the defendant to expedite his return to Idaho and the need to deter the defendant and others from 
future violations. Quiclc Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792 
2. The magistrate and district court decisions 
Here, the facts alleged in Two Jinn's motion and supporting affidavit were not disputed. 
However, although tile magistrate acknowledged that Oregon law does not permit bail agents to 
apprehend fugitives, it denied the motion to exonerate because: 
There are ways to secure the attendance in the State of Idaho of somebody 
who's charged with a misdemeanor. There's nothing before me that anybody has 
ever taken any of those steps. You can invoke the extradition powers of the states 
on a misdemeanor, as well. It is very rarely done. But here there's been no effo~ts 
by anybody that I have seen to try and invoke that process to see if Mr. Harris can 
be brought back through the cooperative efforts of the Governor's Office of the 
State of Idaho and the Governor's office of the State of Oregon. 
-Tr. (10-31-2008), pg. 9, in. 6-15, The magistrate also found that Two Jmn had the obligation to 
adequately secure its bond and: 
when these bonds were forfeited, if the bonding company hadn't secured 
enough collateral, or co-signers, or any other security regarding the obligations, 
that's the bond company's responsibjlity. That's their obligation. 
And I don't find that because they have placed themselves in that situation, 
in this particular case, that it makes it unjust to not forfeiture the bond - or not 
forfeit the bond. 
Tr. (10-31-2008), pg. 10, In. 1-18. 
On appeal to the dlstrict court, Two Jmn argued that the magistrate's oplnlon sent the 
message that "so long as the non-appearing deiendants cross the nearby Oregon border, they will 
be free from the efforts of either their bail agent or the state to secure their return." Tr. (5-27- 
2009), pg. 16, in. 20-25. In response to this argument, the district court indicated: 
Well, that's not the purpose of bond. The purpose of bond is as set forth in Quick 
Release and as noted by [the magistrate], and [Mr. Ha~i-is] didn't show. Harris 
didn't show. I'm not aware of any restriction that - or any statutory requirement 
that only the State can pursue extradition process, and even if that were true, even 
if a statute could be found, really the only effol-ts that Two Jinn brought to bear 
was the filing of the motion to exonerate bond and not - I'm not seeing any direct 
effort on the City of Coeur d'Alene, or I guess to go up the chain of command, 
Kootenai County Prosecutor, State of Idaho AG, so it seems to me that, you know, 
some other things could've been done. 
Id. at pg. pg. 17, In. 1-13 
3. Why relief should be granted 
The magistrate abused its discretion in refusing to exonerate the bond because it applied 
the incorsect legal standard, erroneously believed that Two Jinn could request extradition and 
misunderstood how the purpose of bail is effectuated through relief from fo~feiture. Its decision 
was thus inconsistent with applicable legal standards and not reached through an exercise of 
reason. Therefore, the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's decision 
Initially, the magistrate denied Two Jinn's motion because it concluded Two Jinn failed 
to demonstratc that "it would . . .not be just to let the forfeiture stand." Tr. (10-31-2008), pg. 9, 
In. 4-5; see also pg. 10, In. In. 15-18. However, Rule 46(e)(4) allows the trial court to set aside 
the forfeiture and exonerate the bond if "if it appears that justice does not require a forfeiture's 
enforcement." Thus, rather than determine whether the forfeiture was unjust, the magistrate 
should have determined whether justice required the forfeiture. The distinction between the 
standard ut~hzcd by the magistrate and the standard set forth in Rule 46 reflects the publlc policy 
against forfeiture. See Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 ldaho at 117-18,952 P.2d at 1253-54 
(public policy disfavors forfeitures). In determining whether the forfeiture was unjust instead of 
whether justice 1-equired the forfeiture's enforcement, the magistrate did not reach its decision 
consistently with applicable legal standards. 
Additionally, the magistrate - and the district court - incorrectly weighed the state's 
failure to seek extradition against Two Jinn, rather than applying that factor in Two Jinn's favor. 
In so doing, both the magistrate and the district co~iit erroneously believed that Two Jinn could 
request extradition. However, pursuant to I.C. 3 19-4523(2): 
When the retuin to this state is required of a person who has been convicted of a 
criinc in this state and . . . broken the terms of his . . . probation . . ., the 
prosecuting attorney of the county in which the offense was committed, the 
director of the commission of pardons and parole, or the director of the 
department of correction or his designee, or head of any institution or facility 
operated by or under contract with the department of correction, or sheriff of the 
county from which escape was made, shall present to the governor a written 
application for a requisition for the return of such person, in which application 
shall be stated the name of the person, the crime of which he was convicted, the 
circumstances of his escape from confinement or of the breach of the terms of his 
bail, probation or parole, and the state in which he is believed to be, including the 
location of the person therein at the time application is made. 
I.C. 3 19-4523; see also 1984 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 35, ldaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 84-4, 1984 WL 
162403, pg. 6 (ldaho A.G.) ("the decision to apply to the governor for a wah.ant of extradition is 
committed to the discretion of the county prosecuting attorney"). Two Jinn could only notify the 
state of Mr. Harris's location, which it did via its motion to exonerate. It could not, itself, apply 
to the goveinor to I-equest that Oregon return Mr. Harris for prosecutton. That the state failed to 
exhibit any actual interest in regaining custody of Mr. Harris through prompt efforts to extradite 
him weighs in favor of setting aside the forfeiture. Further, to refuse to exonerate the bond in 
these circumstances rewards the state's lack of interest in extraditing Mr. Harris with a windfall 
of the forfeiture funds in its treasury. 
In finding that exoneration was not warranted because Two Jinn should have secured the 
bond, the magistrate failed to vecognize how the purpose oT bail is effectuated through rules 
providing for relief from forfeiture. Bail is not to punish the surety or to provide the state with a 
windfall but to effectuate the accused's appearance in court. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 
Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. Where the defendant fails to appear, as happened in this case, the 
puil~ose of bail is served by providing the surety a financial incentive to locate the defendant and 
return him to the coust. See C o ~ ~ n t y  Bonding Agency v. State, 724 So.2d 131, 133 (Fla. App. 
1998) ("The purpose of [a Florida statute permitting exoneration when the surety has 
substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant] is to 
create a financial incentive for sureties to locate and apprehend fugitives"); Barber Bonding 
Agency, 860 So.2d at 12 (Liberal intelpretation of forfeiture statutes in favor of sureties provides 
incentives to sureties "to pursue those who flee the jurisdiction"). 
Two Jinn could have simply attempted to collect the amount of forfeiture from the co- 
signer on Mr. Hal-ris's bond. However, encouraging bail bond companies to proceed in that 
manner by refusing to exonerate the bond in circumstances such as these is contrary to public 
polrcy and the ball bond's purpose of effectuating the defendant's appearance rn court Rather, 
the purpose of bail is served by rewarding the bail bond companies' efforts to return the 
defendant to court instead of encouragrng them to s~mply collect money from a co-signor. 
Similarly, the magistrate and district court's conclusion that the forfeiture should stand 
because Mr. H a ~ ~ i s  failed to appear and the purpose of bail had thus not been met also failed to 
recognize the purpose underlying forfeiture. As explained by the California appellate court: 
Given the limited resources of law enforcement agencies, it is bail bond 
companies, as a practical matter, who are most involved in looking for fugitives 
from justice . . . if the bonding company has no assurance that once it has located 
the absconding defendant its bail will be exonerated even if the prosecutor elects 
not to extradite the defendant the company has no financial incentive to undertake 
the search. 
County ofLos Angeles v. Anzerican Co~zlrciclors Irzdenz. Co., 152 Cal.App.4th 661, 666 (Cal. 
App. 2007). Thus, disfavoring forfeiture "is not so much for the bail bond companies" but also 
serves the public interest in "the retuln of fleeing defendants to face tvial and punishment if found 
guilty." Anzericnn Contractors lizdenz. Co., 152 Cal.App.4th at 666. These concerns even 
prompted California and Florida to enact laws providing for exoneration under circumstances 
similar to this case. See Cal. Penal Code 5 1305(g) (providing foi exoneration where a bail agent 
locates a fleeing defendant in another jurisdiction and secures his positive identification but the 
state refuses to extradite after being notified of the defendant's location); County Boizdilzg 
Agency, 724 So.2d at 133 (discussing Florida statute that permits exoneration when the surety 
has substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant) 
It serves the public interest and the primary purpose of bail to provide the surety with an 
incentive to find defendants who have failed to appear. Two Jinn underwent considerable effort 
to locate Mr. Harris, including obtaining his fingerprints, his photograph and a photograph of his 
identification. Two Jinn attempted to persuade Mr. Harris to return and offered to give him a 
ride. Two Jinn then filed a motion to exonerate, which informed the state of Mr. Harris's 
location. If such circumstances are considered insufficient to demonstrate that justice does not 
require enforcement of the forfeiture, hail agents such as Two Jinn will no longer undertake the 
expense to find defendants who have fled Idaho -particularly those who have fled to neighboring 
Oregon where it is unlawful for Two Jinn to apprehend and return the defendant to Idaho to face 
prosecution. See State v. Epps, 585 P.2d 425,428-29 (Or. App. 1978) (holding that common-law 
doctrine giving bail agent absolute dominion over his principal is not recognized in Oregon and 
upholding hail agents' kidnaping convictions for arresting absconding defendant and transporting 
him to California). 
The magistrate erroneously considered whether it was unjust to uphold the forfeitul-e 
rather than whether justice required the forfeiture's enforcement. The magistrate also incorrectly 
weighed the state's failure to seek Mr. Harris's extradition against Two Jinn instead of applying 
that factor in its favor. Further, the magistrate failed to 1-ecognize the policies underlying relief 
from forfeiture, including fulfilling hail's purpose by providing the surety a financial incentive to 
locate absconding defendants. The magistrate thus abused its discretion in failing to reach its 
conclusion consistently with applicable legal standards or through an exercise of reason. 
Moreover, Two Jinn went to extensive effotts to locate the defendant and attempted to 
convince him to return to Idaho. The state failed to take advantage of Two Jinn's investigatory 
efforts and exhibit an interest in prosecuting Mr. Hal~is  by seeking to extradite him. The 
wilfulness of Mr. Hamis's failure to appear is somewhat mitigated by his efforts to contact his 
attorney to obtain a continuance so that he could obtain time off from work. Accordingly, proper 
application of the relevant factors establishes that justice did not require the forfeiture's 
enforcement and the distllct court erred in affirming the magistrate decision to deny Two Jinn's 
motion to exonerate. 
C. The Magistrate Erred In Concluding that the Doctrine of Impossibility Did Not 
Require Exoneration of the Bond. 
The magistrate indicated: "I do not find that the mere fact that the defendant is unwilling 
to return to Oregon [sic] and the inere possible threat of being charged with a crime in Oregon 
creates a legal impossibility such that it would be - not be just to let the forfeiture stand." Tr. 
(10-31-2008), pg. 8, ln.10-19. However, because Oregon law and the state's lack of interest in 
prosecuting Mr. Harris made it impossible for Two Jinn to bring him before the couit, the 
doctrine of impossibility should excuse Two Jinn's performailce under the bail bond agreement. 
A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between the state on one side and an 
accused and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the apperu-ance of 
an accused. State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 993, 995, 188 P.3d 935, 937 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116,952 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 19981. The extent 
of the surety's undertaking is determined by the bond agreement and is subject to the rules of 
contract law and suretyship. Castro, 145 Idaho at 995, 188 P.3d at 937; Abracadabra Bail 
Bon.ds, 131 Idaho at 116,952 P.2d at 1252. Because it is a contract, existing law becomes part of 
the bail bond agreement, as though the contract contains an express provision to that effect 
Abracadabra Bail Boizds, 131 Idaho at 116, 952 P.2d at 1252. The primary aim in interpreting 
contracts is to ascertain the mutual intent of the parties at the time their contract is made. Castro, 
145 Idaho at 995, 188 P.3d at 937 
Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) directs the court to exonerate the bond if the defendant is 
brought before the court within 180 days following forfeiture. Here, Two Jinn located Mr. Harris 
in The Dalles, Oregon within 180 days following the forfeiture, took his fingerprints and 
photograph, photographed his identification, offered transportation back to Idaho and attempted 
to persuade him to voluntarily surrender. R. 122-132. Two Jinn could not arrest Mr. Harris 
because Oregon law does not permit bail agents such as Two Jinn to surrender absconding 
defendants and instead requires use of the extradition process. See Epps, 585 P.2d at 429. The 
state had not requested an extraditable warrant that would have permitted Oregon law 
enforcement to arl-est Mr. Harris at Two Jinn's request. 
'The doctrine of impossibility excuses contractual performance when: (1) a contingency 
occurs; (2) performance is impossible, not just more difficult or more expensive; and (3) the 
nonoccurrence of tile contingency was a basic assumption of the agreement. Kessler v. Tortoise 
Developmeizl, Iizc., 130 Idaho 105, 108, 937 P.2d 417,420 (1997). Sine qua lzolz for application 
of the doctrine is that the parties must have contracted, expressly or in necessary contemplation, 
with reference to continued existence of the specific thing as a condition essential to 
performance. Haessly v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of ldalzo, 121 Idaho 463,465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 
(1992). The task itself must be impossible -the doctrine does not apply if a different promisor 
could perform. State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 198 P.3d 749,752 (Ct. App. 2008). 
The purpose of the bail bond agreement is to effectuate the defendant's presence in court 
to answer to the charges brought by the State - i t  is not meant to collect revenue or to punish 
sureties. 8A Am. Jur. 2d 3 2; see also Quick Release Bail Boizds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 
792.' Thus, the basic assumption of the bail bond contract and an essential component of its 
perfoimance is the state's continued desire to prosecute the defendant. Here, Two Jinn did what 
it could under the contract by locating Mr. Harris but was unable to cause him to be brought 
before the court because the state did not exhibit an interest in regaining his custody. Any bail 
agent would be similarly unable to perform and, thus, the impossibility was not personal to Two 
Jinn. CJI: Chacorz, 146 Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752 (refusing to apply impossibility doctrine to 
defendant's rnabilsty to make drug purchases as a result of target's mistrust of defendant because 
the claiined impossibility was personal to the defendant and he did not argue that i t  was 
impossible for anyone to purchase drugs from the target or other dealers). 
The bail bond's purpose is to effectuate the accused's presence in couit and, thus, it was a 
basic assumption of that contract that the state would continue to desire to prosecute Mr. Harris 
Because the state did notexhibit an interest in regaining custody of Mr. I-Iarris and Oregon law 
does not permit Two Jinn to asrest him, it was impossible for Two Jinn to bring Mr. Harris 
before the court following his failure to appear. Accordingly, the doctrine of impossibility 
should excuse Two Jinn's performance and this Court should reverse the district court's decision 
affirming the magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's motion to exonerate the bond. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Two Jinn respectfully asks that th~s  Court vacate the dlstrict court's order affirming the 
magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate and direct that an order setting aside the 
forfeiture and exonerating the bond be entered 
Respectfully submitted this day of October, 2009. 
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